Reparations over the past few decades have become integral in responding to mass victimisation and conflict in international law and transitional justice. Although the development of reparations in transitional justice has been framed around abusive authoritarian regimes and repairing the harm suffered by civilians, such as in Latin America, there has been contentious reparation rulings by regional human rights courts in situations of internal armed conflict by recognising perpetrators and 'terrorists' as victims and awarding them reparations. Complex identities are particularly acute in situations of internal armed conflict, where protracted internal violence between the state and organised non-state groups, due to the political narratives in legitimatising the violence and victimisation of each 'side'. This paper examines the construction of complex identities in reparation mechanisms and the context of recognising victims and perpetrators in transitional justice processes.
Introduction
Recognising who is a victim in the aftermath of mass violence and conflict can be politically controversial and polemic, owing to contested narratives of victimhood by different actors. The image of victims as 'innocent' is often used to deny victimhood to those who suffered, due to their background or conduct, or to legitimise violence against such individuals or groups. 1 In reality as a result of a crime. 7 Perhaps a criticism of critical victimology is that it neglects the responsibility of victims in victimising others, due to concerns of victim blaming in feminist accounts which helped to shape the field. However, such concerns in domestic victimology may not capture the experience of victimhood in collective violence. This paper takes a nuanced victimological examination of complex victims, who are not just vulnerable objects victimised by others, but appreciates the context of such victimisation in light of their agency to change their circumstances and take responsibility for their actions.
Critical accounts of victimhood acknowledge the socio-political context that in the real world individuals are not always recognised as victims, owing to prevailing political or moral 'labelling' of who a victim should be and who deserves recognition. 8 The victim label can bestow sympathy, praise, or benefits on an individual as it recognises that they have suffered. 9 As such, Christie postulates the 'ideal victim' as society's construction of what a victim should be. 10 The ideal victim is innocent, vulnerable, very young or very old, carrying out a respectable endeavour, and a good citizen who has been attacked by a big, bad offender who is a stranger. 11 This construction of the 'innocent victim' serves to contrast the 'wicked' perpetrator, insurgent, or terrorist. As with the term 'victim', such language for perpetrators can serve a political and moral purpose of dehumanising these individuals to distinguish them as evil, uncivilised, and deserving of punishment or reciprocal violence. 12 This characterisation fits into retributive discourses, simplifying and distorting the occurrence of crimes and violations where such identities do not always exist. 13 For those individuals denied recognition as victims because of their past actions or association, it may cause stigma, emotional trauma, and selfblame. 14 On the other hand there is a danger of individuals as 'ideal victim' to be represented as passive and vulnerable. 15 This conceived vulnerability and passivity of victims can enable others to use victims politically, without considering their agency and autonomy to help themselves or contribute to wider political or legal processes.
The political construction of victimhood is equally utilised on the international stage in response to collective violence and conflict. The use of 'innocent' or 'real' identification of victims within conflict Belligerents in conflicts can portray themselves as collective victims to benefit from the victim label and to be seen as the 'good guys', deserving of sympathy and support, and innocent of any crime.
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Such a perspective can drift into the dangerous waters of 'moral relativism', particularly with international crimes, whereby an individual or group can blame their situation, context or structural factors for committing such crimes, and as a result legitimise violence against individuals, impose collective guilt on groups and people, or deny recognition of certain victims. 18 This is apparent in the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland or the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, where victimisation is used by different actors to construct moral justification and legitimacy of their violence against the other side. 19 Such construction of victimhood and legitimacy can leave little space for complex identities.
In practice collective violence can often be protracted and complex, preventing the identities of victim and perpetrator from fitting into neat, distinct morally acceptable categories. 20 As Borer points out victims and perpetrators of collective violence are not homogenous, nor always diametrically opposed, but can coincide. 21 The 'messy' reality of these situations can mean that there are complex This paper takes a critical approach by recognising such individuals as complex victims to avoid acknowledgement becoming a source of victimisation, but also appreciates the responsibility of such individuals and a more 'thicker' understanding of complex victims in delivering appropriate
reparations. Although such theorisation of complex victims is likely to only apply to a select category of individuals, such an approach is merited as by not recognising them it may lead to three problems:
(1) contributing to narratives that they deserved such suffering or such violence was justified and further entrenching victim stereotypes; (2) preventing the application of reparations to vulnerable or marginalised groups, weakening the purpose of reparations to effectively remedy harm; and (3) undermining the long term prospects of peace by leaving such suffering unaccounted and unresolved.
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For the purposes of this paper the complex identity of victim-perpetrator (complex victims) refers to individuals who are members of armed, paramilitary or terrorist groups, or state forces which commit political violence, but have been victimised through identifiable gross violations of human rights law or international crimes, such as disappearances, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, torture, serious injured, or ill-treatment caused by other actors. These crimes are distinguished due to their jus cogens nature that they are considered in international customary law as objectively illegal and can never be justified in their commission, no matter the background or association of an individual.
29
It is only through recognising such victimisation in a non-discriminatory way can the objectively wrongful nature of such violence be enforced through accountability mechanisms. Reparations are a key justice process in such issues as they acknowledging the suffering caused by offering different Sharing the traumatic experience with others is a precondition for the restitution of a sense of a meaningful world…Restoration of the breach between the traumatized person and the community depends, first, upon public acknowledgement of the traumatic event and, second, upon some form of community action. Once it is publicly recognized that a person has been harmed, the community must take action to assign responsibility for the harm and to repair the injury. These two response -recognition and restitution -are necessary to rebuild the survivor's sense of order and justice.
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The three components of reparations fit into notions of accountability, in that individual or organisation can be held to account for their conduct and face a sanction for violating their obligations. 42 Public acknowledgement of a victim's harm through reparations can establish they are not responsible for their suffering, asserting their dignity and ability to seek redress. 43 Responsibility implicitly defines harm caused to the victim as illegal or a violation, acknowledging the individual was not responsible for their suffering, reaffirming the law and enabling the responsible actor to atone for their wrongdoing. 44 The final component of effective remedy seeks to provide appropriate reparations that can as far as possible wipe out the consequences of the illegal act. 45 It is worth now turning to consider how these elements are constructed in the aftermath of collective violence in addressing complex victims. 
C. Constructing reparations for complex victims in times of transition
Reparations are an important part of many transitional justice processes, both in providing tangible remedies to victims of atrocities and to balance concessions and demobilisation packages made to combatants. 46 For victims reparations are important in acknowledging and remedying their suffering, as well as improving their quality of life. 47 Given that transitional justice has been traditionally rooted in accountability, it can also include other goals of reconciliation and peace building, which can mask tensions between such purposes. 48 Reparations as amalgamation of accountability and reconciliation can complement other processes, but can also be contentious owing to competing demands. Criminal trials alone may not ensure that every perpetrator is held to account, owing to issues over sufficient evidence and cost, meaning that not every victim will have their day in court. Truth commissions while offering some comfort to victims in acknowledging a historical account of the past, do not by themselves offer tangible outcomes that can remedy the specific harm caused to them and improve their quality of life. Reparations can complement such processes and others, such as DDR, by offering redress to those most affected by violence as well as those responsible at the individual and institutional level contributing to the remedy, reflecting reparative justice. In turn, reparations are not an exclusive means to address past violations or determine responsibility, but need to be complemented with other processes, such as truth commissions and criminal trials, which can contribute to unearth responsible actors and suffering.
Reparations in countries undergoing transition are not perfect. Such programmes can be distinguished as a political project by managing different political discourses and distributive justice concerns, such as maximising benefits to society through the allocation of resources in the aftermath of collective violence. 49 As Teitel suggests, the harm caused to individuals and society is 'potentially limitless', with those who have suffered political persecution being a more appropriate determiner. 50 Some countries tend to prioritise certain suffering over others, on the basis of using resources efficiently when adopting reparations programmes. Most programmes concentrate on those vulnerable individuals and groups who suffered and continue to suffer from the physical, psychological or economic consequences of gross violations of human rights, such as disappearances, extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, torture, and serious injuries. 51 With finite resources a state cannot remedy the suffering of all victims due to economic limitations in terms of cost and time, but also political restraints in recognising victims.
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Determining who can claim reparations in countries which have experienced mass violence is a politically fraught process. The mass scale of victimisation caused by collective violence raises logistical challenges in how beneficiaries can be demarcated so as to ensure that a reparation mechanism is effective and meaningful to them. This evinces Veitch's asymmetrical nature of law that it is unable to effectively hold all those responsible to account for the mass suffering caused. 53 As a result, the law instead 'organises irresponsibility' enabling contested notions of victimhood to prevail by prioritising responses to certain victims over others. discusses the political contention around reparations for complex victims, before moving onto examine in the subsequent sub-section how different context have tried to deal with the issue.
Reparations for innocent and complex victims
The latent nature of complex victims in the transitional justice reparations literature can be explained by them coming into conflict with demands of other victims or the public. Victim-perpetrators are often excluded from reparations on the grounds of avoiding 'moral equivalence' with innocent victims. In the sense that complex victims should be denied access to reparations as they took up arms against their fellow country men and women, thereby contrary to the ideal victim of being a good citizen and 'innocent' of any wrongdoing. This distinction may also be a means for such 'innocent' victims to find some sort of order in the aftermath of such traumatic experience that reparations validate their blamelessness in their suffering, and maintain the myopic view of the wrongfulness of a perpetrator. need and who continue to suffer from the effects of violence. 63 The risk with complex victims is by recognising perpetrators as victims it could be used to legitimise their violence against others and avoid their responsibility in victimising others. 64 That said acknowledging all those who suffer, including members of armed groups, for the purpose of victim reparation, may divest such individuals of their agency, political participation, and responsibility by framing their role in the conflict in terms of victimisation and passivity, requiring a more nuanced approach. 65 Accordingly the purpose of this paper is to explore how a more nuanced picture of acknowledgement and responsibility can be developed in reparation programmes to respond to complex victimisation in periods of transition, without diluting the meaning of victimhood and the remedial nature of reparations.
2.
Reconciling acknowledgement and responsibility of complex victims Recognising complex victims as beneficiaries and responsible actors for reparations has to generally fit into the transitional political project. Where complex victims are able to access reparations it is seen to be congruent to the dominant political narrative of the wrongfulness of the state's actions, such as in Chile. 66 The 83 This is in contrast to members of the security forces who are recognised as victims with access to reparations, without any distinction with those who are responsible for committing violations. 84 For those individuals killed by state forces, a criminal investigation needs to be completed that the person was not a member of an illegal armed group to claim reparations. As Amnesty International point out given that these investigations rarely reach a conclusion, it will have the effect of excluding numerous victims from reparations. 85 The current negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government in Havana have indicated that FARC as a group will provide a reparations fund for those victimised with the group, but for the government to provide redress to members and families of those harmed by state forces. clashes from reparations, as they took up arms against the democratic government, and were subjected to legitimate force by the state. As such, they were 'victims, but not beneficiaries'. 87 Although such reasoning is compliant with domestic and international law on the use of force and human rights, it presupposed that such force was legitimate. Furthermore, such presumption on the legitimacy of state violence allows state forces to be included as 'victims' in reparation programmes on the basis that they were protecting the community, despite documented widespread and systematic human rights abuses.
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This distinction between state and non-state actors is present in the PIR reparation scheme. The PIR scheme offers both individual and collective reparations, but the delivery of individual reparations has been delayed to identify and exclude members of illegal armed groups. It has taken years to screen applicants to avoid members of subversive groups benefitting from reparations. 89 Nevertheless this approach risks excluding many individuals in Peru who were wrongly convicted of membership of illegal armed groups such as the Shining Path, but allow those who were never identified to access reparations. 90 Such a broad distinction also prevents vulnerable individuals within such communities to access an effective remedy, who did not have the freedom or capacity for the violence they committed, such as children who were members of illegal groups at the time.
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In contrast to these contexts, discussion on reparations in Northern Ireland in dealing with the past have been virtually non-existent, given the contested nature of which victims should be acknowledged and who is responsible, with greater attention on truth and justice. 92 In 2009 the Consultative Group on the Past (CGP) was established to find solutions to dealing with past in Northern
Ireland. The final report of the CGP recognising the shortcomings of compensation for the harm caused by the conflict, and recommended that a 'one-off ex-gratia recognition payment' of £12,000 be paid to the relatives of those killed during the conflict, to acknowledge the loss they have endured. 93 The language of 'ex-gratia' is important, as it implies that such a payment is charitable, rather than based on any legal obligation. Nonetheless, this one recommendation proved politically controversial, as family members of terrorists who were killed would receive money, it resulted in the whole report being rejected. More recent proposals of a pension for those severely injured during the Troubles and their carers, have been appropriated by some politicians wanting to ensure that only 'innocent' victims can avail of the pension, despite the serious suffering of complex victims and the likelihood that only a handful of them would be eligible. 94 More problematic in Northern Ireland is that these proposals are based on discretionary charity and moral concern, rather than as a right to reparations involving a legal entitlement to a remedy. Such proposals stand in stark contrast to demobilisation packages and damages paid to members of the security forces, again applied without any distinction as in the Colombian and Peruvian contexts.
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In these different contexts we can see that who is acknowledged as a victim is politically 
D.
Alternative perspectives
Human Rights and Reparations
Reparations have long been associated in human rights law a remedial measures to 'promote justice by redress'. 99 The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations (UNBPG) represents the main international norms on reparations, although it is a soft law declaratory document. It defines victim broadly as, persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights,… through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term "victim" also includes the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.
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Principle 25 further stipulates that reparations should be applied 'without any discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception.' Shelton elaborates that the 'character of the victim should not be considered because it is irrelevant to the wrong and to the remedy, and implies a value judgement 98 Garcia-Godos n.65,.p79. on the worth of an individual that has nothing to with the injury suffered.' 101 To do otherwise would undermine the objectivity of such a determination by basing such decisions on moral, rather than legal responsibility. 102 This principle of 'non-discrimination' is consistent with cases of torture, whereby the prohibition of such ill-treatment is absolute, no matter the political context or character of the individual. 103 As such, complex victims who suffer from gross violations of human rights are human beings who have a right to reparations, no matter their responsibility, which should not prevent or bar their access to a remedy.
Although the non-discrimination principle is prevalent in contemporary human rights law for complex victims of gross violations, this has not always been the case. The European Court of Human Rights has distinguished complex victims from claiming reparations in earlier cases. In the McCann and others v United Kingdom three members of the IRA were killed by British special forces in Gibraltar, who were planning to detonate a bomb at a military parade. The Court found that while the use of force was not 'absolutely necessary' and their right to life had been violated, the families of those killed were not entitled to reparations as the Court stated itself, 'having regard to the fact that the three terrorist suspects who were killed had been intending to plant a bomb in Gibraltar, the Court does not consider it appropriate to make an award.' 104 In more recent decisions the Court has not distinguished complex victims, instead focusing on whether the state carried out an effective investigation, rather than a factual analysis of whether individuals' substantive right to life had been violated. 105 Although not Human rights jurisprudence is important in two respects in how reparations can capture a just solution in dealing with complex victims. Firstly human rights courts generally follow the principle of non-discrimination when it comes to holding state responsible for violating human rights obligations.
Thus regional human rights courts take a more objective analysis. However, the right to reparation as vindication to individuals who have been subjected to gross human rights violations, is problematic in applying to members of non-state armed groups who are victimised by the state. This leads to the second issue that human rights courts struggle with their one-dimensional jurisdictional reach as enforcing the obligations of the state, preventing it from examining the responsibility of private individuals and groups. This inability to distinguish the responsibility of complex victims is likely to cause political strife, as only a handful of victims are able to access regional human rights courts, causing an imbalance between those before the court and the majority of victims' reliant on national mechanisms.
Unsurprisingly reparations determined in regional human rights courts in times of internal armed conflict can have a significant political impact on the domestic transitional justice landscape, as in the case of Peru. 112 Ultimately the human rights approach by itself does not provide a complete picture, but rather captures a microcosm of responsibility and victimisation, instead of the larger complex web of victimisation and responsibility that characterises collective violence. These two points of human rights do represent important moral values inherent in rights based approaches. In the sense that individuals who are subjected to gross violations of human rights or international crimes should have a right to an effective remedy, no matter their conduct. However, for those they victimised they have a similar right to remedy against those who victimised them whether it be the individual, group or state.
Development aid, services and collective reparations as a workaround?
In to return without fear of prosecution and to avail of a demobilisation package. 117 However, these programmes involve reconstruction of infrastructure and development of social services to the general population, but they do not specifically remedy or acknowledge the harm suffered by victims and seek to remedy their harm. In addition, the Trust Fund for Victims in conjunction with the International Criminal Court also provides assistance to some victims, including sensitisation programmes, reconstructive surgery, and counselling. 118 Yet this assistance does not specifically remedy the harm caused to victims.
Moreover, such development avoids the responsibility of the state in atrocities its forces committed.
The second type of general assistance are services. In Northern Ireland, a service based approach has dominated provision to victims and survivors' needs. As a result of the Good Friday Agreement and subsequent reports in to provisions for victims, funds where established to support victims through numerous victim groups, representing different areas, constituents and political opinion. 119 Beneficiaries of such schemes are based on a broad definition of victim as 'someone who is or has been physically or psychologically injured, [provides substantial amount of care for such a person, or bereaved] as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident'. 120 The inclusive nature of the definition was intentional to avoid contention over service provision, reflecting more humanitarian concerns than accountability. 121 Services provided to victims are funded now through the Victims and Survivors Service (VSS), and reviewed through the Commission for Victims and Survivors. 122 Services included counselling, befriending, respite breaks, chronic pain management and retraining schemes. However, the service basis of support to victims is based on budgetary allocations by the local Northern Ireland government, making such provision discretionary without any long term commitment. 123 In terms of accountability such measures do not publicly acknowledge individuals as victims, as service provision loses the recognition, entitlement and responsibility aspects, associated with reparations, through their delivery by groups. In terms of remedy, services provided have been criticised for their access issues, location, standard of provision, and ability to respond to victims' needs. 124 The third type of general assistance is collective reparations, which are measures awarded to groups or communities identified as having suffered and can include symbolic measures, such as memorials. Collective reparations can be more cost effective in offering acknowledgement to large groups of victims, rather than individual monetary awards. These awards can avoid victim competition by applying equally to all those victimised, thereby avoiding a hierarchy of suffering sometimes associated with compensation. 125 They can also potentially benefit other victims who are able, such as the construction of a health centre in an area. But this is a double-edged sword, as collective reparations risk compromising individual victims' right to a remedy and benefiting those who were not victimised.
In Peru, while members of the Shining Path are excluded from individual reparations, they are able to benefit from collective reparations awarded to communities. 126 In gives value to victims who seek it to have their own harm acknowledged and to hold those responsible to redress the harm they have caused.
Conceivably, there is another way, between recognising victimisation and responsibility. Such an approach would require an inclusive approach to acknowledge victimisation caused by gross violations of human rights, allowing states the flexibility to prioritise those which cause the most acute and continuing suffering, i.e. disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings, and sexual violence.
Responsibility of complex victims would not exclude them from reparations, given the serious nature of the violence committed against them. They would however be limited to certain types of reparations, such as rehabilitation and pecuniary damages, or alternatively compensation awards could have a symbolic amount deducted, i.e. 10%, to reflect their responsibility in victimising others. Illegal armed groups and the state would also be responsible actors, which can contribute to reparations. Such a complex approach better captures the lived experience of individuals and groups in collective violence, which not only involves victims, perpetrators and complex victims, but also non-state and state actors.
E. Conclusion
As transitional justice has been traditionally rooted in accountability we hold onto simplistic definitions of identity and responsibility to help make sense of senseless violence. In life, violence and human behaviour do not lend themselves to such superficial distinctions of innocent victims and bad perpetrators. This contention of identity is accentuated with reparations, which attempt to remedy harm caused and acknowledge suffering by those responsible. A complex picture of victimisation and responsibility recognises that victims are not always innocent, but can be or become victimisers. This is not to deny their suffering or to say that some or all victims will be perpetrators. Rather the intention here is to acknowledge that victims are human beings who have suffered, and that some of them through their conduct or association are responsible for victimising others. As noted at the start of this paper, failing to include complex victims within reparations mechanisms has the potential to reinforce innocent victim stereotypes, deny redress to those complex victims who have suffered from gross violations of human rights, and could undermine long term prospects of peace by inhibiting the remedial and accountability prospects. For reparations to reconcile the acknowledgement and responsibility of complex victims it requires a more composite approach to accountability.
Reparations in transitional justice, although a more political project, than a juridical one, depend on whether complex victims are deemed to 'fit' within the dominant political narrative that emerges from the transition. As such the application and adherence of legal principles and rules is more flexible than that of a court. Just as identity in transitional societies can be used to construct legitimacy, so to can reparations. As a political project, given the asymmetry between suffering and the law's ability to hold those responsible to account, reparations in transitional justice processes often involve the prioritisation of suffering of certain individuals and groups over others. 
